INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP TEXAS/OSGOOD CENTER
LONE STAR MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2023
SECURITY COUNCIL (SC)
Background Guide
Richardson, Texas / November 4-5, 2023

A wide view of the Security Council Chamber as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (on screen) of Ukraine, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation in Ukraine. UN Photo/Loey Felipe
Source: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115632

After the world suffered two world wars, one of the greatest achievements in global history was the creation of the United Nations (UN) as an intergovernmental organization with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, creating the conditions conducive to economic and social development, and advancing universal respect for human rights. The Security Council became one of the six principal organs of the UN; it was given the primary responsibility of preserving international peace and security. This changed globally the perception of wars, domestic conflicts, and regional threaths from localized matters to international concerns and meant that world leaders and member states are required to act collectively. The parallel development of international principles and regional standards later reinforced this call for universal accountability.

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House in London. After its first meeting, the Council relocated to its permanent residence at the UN Headquarters in New York City. At that time, five permanent members and six non-permanent members were part of the Council. In 1965, the number of non-permanent members increased to 10 and discussions regarding a change in configuration took place frequently. As the body's structure has remained largely unchanged, debate has arisen over the Security Council's efficacy and authority as a mediator on issues of international security. Matters such as the situation in Ukraine, the Syrian Civil War, Russia's annexation of Crimea, and The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear weapons program have posed particular challenges to the Security Council.

Traditionally, the Security Council discusses issues related to peacekeeping missions, political processes, as well as the protection of human rights, disarmament, and humanitarian crises. However, with the adoption of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* by the UN General Assembly in 2015, the Security Council has begun to increasingly focus on the intersection between sustainability, peace, and security. Some important crosscutting issues the Council is currently addressing include human rights and the protection of civilians for conflict prevention and sustainable development; Women, Peace, and Security; and the prevention of conflict and sustaining peace.

Governance, Structure, and Membership

In the United Nations system, the Security Council has an exclusive power: it is the only body with the power to adopt legally binding resolutions. The decisions of the Security Council are formal expressions of the will of this body responsible of maintaining international security and peace. More importantly, the Members of the United Nations, according to article 25 of the Charter, "agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

The Security Council has multiple tools at its disposal to address issues on the body's agenda. For example, the President of the Security Council may issue press statements or presidential statements to communicate the Council's position. Although these are not legally binding, such statements are used to bring attention to important issues and to recommend solutions to ongoing conflicts. In addition, the Security Council can achieve its goals through various mechanisms, which have evolved in its history. It can propose peaceful settlements of disputes by diverse means, including mediation processes, negotiations, peacekeeping operations, and calls for ceasefires. The Security Council can also impose sanctions to the Member states, and ultimately, as a last resort, its members can authorize the use of military force. The traditional role of the Security Council in implementing strategies to tackle issues related to disarmament, political development, peacekeeping, humanitarian crises, and to the protection human rights has also changed and has been revitalized.

The Security Council is a body of 15 members. There are five members which have permanent membership: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Along with the five permanent members, 10 non-permanent members serve in the Security Council. The General Assembly annually elects by a two-thirds the 10 non-permanent members for a two-year term. Security Council elections are held six months before the term starts in June. This change allows Member States sufficient time to prepare for their new role.

Currently, Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates are the non-permanent members for the 2023-2024 term.

CHECK: https://www.un.org/en/media/accreditation/pdf/SC_Membership.pdf

A wide view of an installation ceremony of the national flags of the countries of the newly elected non-permanent members to serve on the U.N. Security Council for the term 2022-23 is held at the United Nations headquarters building in New York City, January 5, 2022. Credit: U.N. Photo/Eskinder Debebe

Consistent with the Council's mandate, the essential factor for eligibility is a member state's contribution "to the maintenance of international peace and security" reflected on the potential states' financial or troop contributions to peacekeeping efforts or its leadership roles on regional security. Another aspect considered is the "equitable geographical distribution". To promote geographical inclusion, since 1965 the Council includes 3 seats for the Group of African States (GAFS); two seats for the Asia-Pacific Group, one for the Group of Eastern European States (EGG); one for the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC); two for the Group of Western European and Other States (WEOG). Each group has its own electoral norms. An Arab seat alternates between the African and Asian blocs by informal agreement. Turkey and Israel, which has never served on the council, caucus with WEOG.

States participate in a highly competitive process to be elected for the non-permanent seats on the Security Council; this includes long campaigns and statements of interests. Once states are elected to serve on the Security Council, they are expected to represent regional interests; these states are usually influential at the international level and demonstrate leadership in specific areas of interest to their respective foreign policy regional agendas. Each member of the Security Council can be represented at all meetings. In the Provisional Rules of Procedure, Rule 13 allows for Members to be represented by an accredited representative," such as a Head of Government.

The mandate of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security and to act whenever peace and security are threatened. The Council's authority is particularly relevant with respect to the UN's four primary purposes, as specified in the Charter: maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations; cooperating in solving international problems; and promoting respect for human rights. The Security Council's capabilities are highlighted in Chapters V–VIII. Chapter V establishes the structure, membership, functions, and powers of the Security Council. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter specifically concern the Security Council and the range of actions that can be taken when settling disputes. Chapter VI of the Charter by itself aims to settle disputes through peaceful means, such as negotiation and judicial settlement. Chapter VII explores further actions the Council can take when responding to threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. This chapter also authorizes the Security Council to implement provisional measures aimed to de-escalate the situation. Chapter VIII of the Charter allows the Security Council to call upon other regional agencies or arrangements to enforce appropriate operations and intervene if necessary.

Under Article 41 of the Charter, the Council can call upon UN Member States to enact economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or end violence. Some of these measures include arms embargos, enforcing disarmament, or calling upon international criminal mechanisms to become active. Regarding diplomatic tools, the Council is mandated to investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to aggression between states, with other non-state groups, or within states' territories. The Council may also take military action against a state or other entity threatening international peace and security and may further decide on the deployment of troops or observers.

Bangladeshi peacekeepers offer hope to villagers in Northern Mali
Source: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/bangladeshi-peacekeepers-offer-hope-to-villagers-northern-mali

The Council may also decide upon the deployment of new UN peacekeeping missions to be led by the Department of Peace Operations. The Security Council creates a peacekeeping operation by adopting a resolution that outlines the mandate and size of a particular mission, and UN peacekeepers are assigned to appropriate regions to address conflicts. The Council also cooperates with several international and regional organizations as well as non-governmental organizations to implement its decisions

Every Member State of the Security Council has one vote. Votes on all matters require a majority of nine Member States. However, if one of the five permanent members of the Security Council votes "no" on a matter of substance, such as a draft resolution, it does not pass. This is known as *"veto power."*

In the 1950s, Security Council Member States made frequent use of their **veto power**, but its usage declined in the 1960s—rising again in the 1970s and 1980s. Recently, the use of the veto power has raised new criticisms in the international community and has sparked discussions about the power structures within the UN system.

Russia's U.N. Ambassador Russia Vasily Nebenzya casts the lone dissenting vote in the United Nations Security Council, February 25, 2022. Two days into Russia's attack on Ukraine, a majority of U.N. Security Council members voted to demand that Moscow withdraw. But one thing stood in their way: a veto by Russia itself. (AP Photo/Seth Wenig, File) Source: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-general-assembly-business-europe-states-3e1560d3b38bc0110d65fe388a6ea4ad/gallery/296ab8d924914e4b806b9e6015def312

Security Council members, from left, Britain's Ambassador to the UN Barbara Woodward; US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield; Albania's UN Ambassador Ferit Hoxha; and Brazil's Ambassador to the UN Ronaldo Costa Filho, vote in the United Nations Security Council, February 25, 2022. (AP Photo/Seth Wenig) Source: https://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-vetoes-un-security-council-resolution-demanding-it-withdraw-from-ukraine/

Since 1993, the General Assembly deliberated several proposals to reform the Security Council. Key challenges to reforming the Security Council are its membership, transparency and working methods, and the veto power of the permanent five Member States. In 2018, delegates within the UN General Assembly called for expanding the number of permanent members and abolishing the permanent member's use of veto power.

Conclusion

The Security Council is one of the main bodies of the UN that ensures international peace and security, overseeing the admission of new members to the UN General Assembly, and changes to the UN Charter. The Council also has a unique and impactful mandate to set norms and govern state actions, as all Member States are required to comply with the Security Council's legally binding decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter, the only UN body to have legally binding decisions. Although the Security Council is first and foremost the primary UN entity responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda signaled the increasing need to also discuss the linkages between peace and security, and issues of human security and development. The Council has begun looking at the intersection between the SDGs and international peace and security, namely through discussion and debates on the impact of emerging technologies in achieving international peace and security.

TOPIC 1: THE SITUATION IN SUDAN

What is that the situation in Sudan?

CHECK: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/19/sudan-conflict-generals-burhan-hamdan-hemeti-rsf/
https://www.voanews.com/a/fleeing-sudan-s-conflict-on-a-bus-ride-from-khartoum-/7070818.html
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-extent-sudans-humanitarian-crisis
https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137292
https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15381.doc.htm#:~:text=The%20situation%20in%20the%20two,of%20the%20Sudanese%20Armed%20Forces.
https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15305.doc.htm
https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/01/sudan-concrete-un-security-council-action-needed
https://acleddata.com/2023/04/14/sudan-situation-update-april-2023-political-process-to-form-a-transitional-civilian-government-and-the-shift-in-disorder-trends/

TOPIC 2: PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND THEIR IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

CHECK:
https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14563.doc.htm
https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1r/k1ryrk0n4o
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/05/technology-and-security-briefing.php
https://www.cfr.org/blog/un-security-council-tackles-emerging-technologies

CHECK: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/24/100-days-of-conflict-in-sudan-a-timeline

Background and Key Recent Developments

Sudan has been grappling with the devastating consequences of fighting that erupted on **15 April of 2023** between the **Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF),** headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan's military leader and chairperson of the Transitional Sovereign Council, and the **Rapid Support Forces (RSF),** a paramilitary group led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemeti). The fighting, which was initially centered around Khartoum, has steadily engulfed several parts of the country.

On 9 August, the Security Council held an open briefing to discuss the situation in Sudan at the request of the UK, the penholder on the file. Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-

DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and Director of OCHA's Operations and Advocacy Division Edem Wosornu briefed. In her remarks, Pobee noted that clashes between the Sudanese warring parties continued across various parts of the country, including Khartoum, Bahri, Omdurman, and Darfur, with neither side achieving victory nor making any significant gains. She added that eastern Sudan, which has been relatively calm, has witnessed active mobilization efforts in support of the SAF, which **"risks plunging the east into conflict along ethnic lines, further highlighting the fragility of the region"**.

Political Violence in Sudan 15 July - 4 August 2023

Key Developments

Political events

24 July
The General Intelligence Service arrests Arab Baath party leaders in Ed Debba, Northern state.

30 July
The Sudan Civil Aviation Authority extends the closure of the country's airspace until 15 August.

31 July
Rashaida and Hadendawa-Beja communities announce their support for the SAF.

2 August
North Kordofan authorities declare a state of emergency and impose a night curfew.

4 August
General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan establishes a committee to investigate war crimes and human rights violations.

4 August
Several native administrations in Central Darfur announce their support for the RSF.

Violent events

16 July
The RSF takes control of Kass city in South Darfur following clashes with the SAF.

18 July
The SPLM-N al-Hilu faction overtakes al-Rosieris after clashes with the SAF in South Kordofan.

22 July
The SAF claims killing dozens of RSF soldiers in al-Msodiya, al-Jazirah.

22 July
Fighting erupts between the Kababish militia and the RSF in North Kordofan.

24 July
Hundreds of RSF soldiers are reportedly killed in SAF bombings in al-Jarif East, Khartoum.

26 July
The RSF and Arab militias clash with Erenga militias and overtake Sirba in West Darfur.

Event Type
- Protests
- Explosions/Remote violence
- Violence against civilians
- Battles

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Key Figures

Number of Events 353
41% increase compared to the three weeks prior

Reported Fatalities 1,092
55% increase compared to the three weeks prior

Number of Events
- 1
- 5
- 10
- 15
- 17

Note: Political violence falling under the Protest event type is limited to the sub-event type Excessive force against protesters.

Wosornu provided an overview of the increasingly dire humanitarian situation in the country and described the recent efforts of the UN to provide humanitarian assistance. She noted that intense fighting and the difficult operating environment are limiting the ability of humanitarian actors to deliver aid. She emphasized the need to establish a platform for direct and regular contact at a senior level with the Sudanese warring parties on humanitarian issues to negotiate access and protect humanitarian operations in the Sudan.

The situation in Darfur has deteriorated further with the outbreak of inter-communal fighting, with Arab militias supporting the RSF and targeting non-Arab groups. **In a 4 August statement, the Troika on Sudan (Norway, the UK, and the US) condemned the ongoing violence in Darfur, especially reports of killings based on ethnicity and widespread sexual violence by the RSF and allied militias. They expressed concern about reports of a military build-up near El Fasher and Nyala.** "Those responsible for any atrocities against civilians, especially those including [conflict-related sexual violence] and the targeting of humanitarian relief actors, medical personnel, and other service providers, must be held to account", the statement added. **READ** the statement: https://www.state.gov/statement-on-atrocities-in-darfur-sudan/

Previously, the Troika in Sudan had also issued a joint statement on June 27, 2023. **READ** the statement: https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-by-the-troika-on-sudan-and-south-sudan/#:~:text=Troika%20envoys%20condemned%20the%20widespread,to%20control%20their%20forces%2C%20ensure

In recent weeks, the fighting has intensified in several parts of the country. In a 14 August press release, OCHA expressed concerns about reports of deadly clashes in Nyala, South Darfur. According to a 23 August OCHA Humanitarian Update, these clashes, which took place from 11 to 17 August, displaced approximately 50,000 people, killed at least 60 and injured 250 others.


On 14 August, clashes between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Al Hilu faction and the SAF were also reported near the Hajr Al-Maak neighbourhood in Kadugli Town, South Kordofan, forcing at least 6,700 people to flee to the town's western Al Radaif neighborhood. CHECK: https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/flash-update/2ssdvuTvoamtqksQt7q4O/

In recent months, several regional and international stakeholders have led mediation efforts aimed at resolving the crisis. The members of the **Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Quartet (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan)** held their first meeting on 10 July in Addis

Ababa. In a communiqué adopted following the meeting, the Quartet expressed concern over the spread of violence beyond Khartoum to other parts of Sudan, particularly Darfur and Kordofan. The members resolved "to request the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) summit to convene in order to consider the possible deployment of the EASF for the protection of civilians and [to] guarantee humanitarian access". They further emphasised the centrality of IGAD in coordinating the different diplomatic efforts alongside the AU. In an 11 July **press release**, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry rejected the call for deployment of the EASF and stated that it will consider any such forces being deployed as "aggressor forces".

Fighting Between the SAF and RSF in Khartoum

15 July - 4 August 2023

Sub-Event Type
- Government regains territory
- Air/drone strike
- Shelling/artillery/missile attack
- Armed clash

Number of Events
- 1
- 5
- 10
- 15
- 17

Karrari

SAF Base

Al-Halfaya Bridge

Omdurman

CRP Headquarters

Bahri

Omdurman Market

Blue Nile Bridge

Signal Weapon SAF Base

Radio and TV Commission

Bahri Market

Koper Bridge

Presidential Palace

General Command Headquarters

Arabic Market

RSF Base

Engineers SAF Base

Strategic Corps SAF Base

SAF Air Defense Base

Jabra SAF Base

Khartoum

Sports City

Factories Complex

Legend
- Airport
- Factory
- Base
- Government Building
- Market
- Radio and TV Commission
- Sports City
- Bridge
- Road

© 2023 Mapbox © OpenStreetMap

On 19 August, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir met Kenyan President William Ruto in Nairobi. According to a 20 August Sudan Tribune article, South Sudanese Minister of Presidential Affairs Barnaba Marial Benjamin said that the situation in Sudan was a central focus of the discussions. He added that "**the situation has progressed beyond being solely a humanitarian crisis to now encompassing broader regional dynamics**".

President William Ruto meets South Sudan President Salva Kiir.
Image: DPPS

On 13 July, Egypt hosted the **"Sudan's Neighboring States Summit",** bringing together the heads of state and governments of the **Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and South Sudan,** with the **aim of finding a solution to the ongoing crisis in Sudan.** The leaders agreed to establish a ministerial mechanism comprising foreign ministers of Sudan's neighboring states to coordinate their efforts to resolve the conflict. The first meeting of the ministerial mechanism was held in N'Djamena on 7 August. The communiqué adopted following the meeting noted that the foreign ministers had developed a three-part plan of action: the achievement of a definitive ceasefire; the organization of an inclusive inter-Sudanese dialogue; and the management of humanitarian issues. **READ** the communiqué: https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/183662/Communique-of-Sudan%E2%80%99s-Neighboring-States-Summit/?lang=en-us

Sudan's humanitarian needs are significant and have been evolving rapidly. According to the latest **Integrated Food Security Phase (IPC) projections**, <mark>around 20.3 million people, representing more than 42 percent of the country's population, are expected to experience high levels of acute food insecurity between July and September.</mark> CHECK:
https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Jun2023_Feb2024_report.pdf

SECOND PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (OCTOBER 2023 – FEBRUARY 2024)

Key for the Map
IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

(mapped Phase represents highest severity affecting at least 20% of the population)

- 1 - Minimal
- 2 - Stressed
- 3 - Crisis
- 4 - Emergency
- 5 - Famine
- Areas not analysed

Evidence Level
✳✳ Medium

Attacks on humanitarian personnel remain a major impediment to the delivery of humanitarian relief to vulnerable populations. According to OCHA's 23 August update, 19 aid workers have been killed in Sudan and 26 have been detained since 15 April. Attacks on civilian infrastructure and healthcare facilities also remain an issue of concern. So far, the World Health Organization (WHO) has verified 53 attacks on healthcare centers, staff, ambulances, and warehouses in Sudan since the conflict began.

In a 25 August statement, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths warned that **the ongoing conflict, food insecurity, spread of disease, and displacement threaten to "consume the entire country".** He noted that food stocks are fully depleted in Kadugli, as clashes and road blockages prevent aid workers from reaching people in need. In West Kordofan's capital, El Fula, humanitarian offices have been ransacked and supplies looted, he added. He further expressed concern that a protracted conflict in Sudan could engulf the entire region into a humanitarian catastrophe. READ the statement:

Human Rights-Related Developments

© UNHCR/Colin Delfosse
Food and other items are distributed in Chad to people who have fled violence in Sudan.

On 15 August, High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk highlighted in a press release that the **"disastrous, senseless"** war in Sudan has resulted in acts that may amount to war crimes. **There are reasonable grounds to believe that the SAF and the RSF have committed serious violations of international law, he said, and noted the impact of the war on civilians, including women and children, as well as humanitarian and health workers.**

The statement highlighted the dire humanitarian situation, with the **displacement of more than four million people due to the war.** It further indicated that hundreds of people, including political activists and human rights defenders, have been detained arbitrarily and held incommunicado by both parties to the conflict. **READ** the press release:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/sudan-human-rights-situation#:~:text=GENEVA%20(15%20August%202023)%20%E2%80%93,essential%20services%2C%20massive%20displacement%2C%20as

Since the start of the conflict in Sudan in mid-April, **large numbers of civilians have been forced to flee, including people who were already internally displaced and refugees from other countries who had sought safety in Sudan.**

Hundreds of thousands of people have fled into neighboring countries or returned home in adverse circumstances – notably to the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. Others self-relocated within Sudan.

Total Forcibly Displaced   JSON

4,981,372

Last updated 04 Sep 2023

Source - IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, COR

OUTSIDE SUDAN

Total newly arrived refugees, asylum seekers, and returnees   JSON

992,124

Last updated 04 Sep 2023

Total newly arrived refugees/asylum seekers   JSON

759,233

Last updated 04 Sep 2023

Total newly arrived refugee returnees   JSON

232,891

Last updated 04 Sep 2023

https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudansituation

DISPLACEMENT TRENDS (AS OF 29 AUGUST)

3,801,754
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

1,072,804
Arrivals in Neighboring Countries

During its 54th session, the Human Rights Council is expected to hold an interactive dialogue on 12 September on the oral update of the High Commissioner on the situation in Sudan.

Displaced mother receives hygiene kit in Gedaref.

Sanctions-Related Developments

On 7 August, the Panel of Experts assisting the Sudan Sanctions Committee transmitted its interim report to the Council. It appears that the report described various aspects of the ongoing conflict, including its dynamics, funding, humanitarian impact, recruitment patterns of the warring parties, the proliferation of weapons and violation of the arms embargo, and its regional impact.

On 11 August, the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee held informal consultations during which it received a briefing on the panel's interim report.

Women, Peace, and Security

Following the 25 August Council briefing on the Secretary-General's 17th biannual strategic-level report on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) to international peace and security, the members that endorsed the 1 December 2021 Shared Commitments on Women, Peace and Security—Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Japan, Malta, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the

UK, and the US—delivered a statement on Sudan expressing "grave concern regarding the continued reports of gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence in Sudan's conflict". The statement referred to reports of systematic and widespread use of sexual and gender-based violence, including rape, kidnapping and sexual exploitation in Darfur and other areas of Sudan. Recalling UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk's 15 August remarks on the conflict in Sudan, the statement underscored that "perpetrators must be held accountable".

Key Issues and Options

A key issue for the Security Council is how to stop the fighting in Sudan. A further issue is the situation in Darfur and the levels of intercommunal violence and insecurity across the country. The Council could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue (IID) with key stakeholders, including Sudanese civilian leaders, interested member states and regional and sub-regional organizations to discuss the search for a mediated solution to the crisis. The IID is a closed format that, unlike consultations, allows for the participation of non-UN officials and briefers.

Another issue for the Security Council is the humanitarian crisis and how to ensure continuous and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid and, at the same time, secure the safety and security of UN officials and other humanitarian actors. Periodic briefings by OCHA could help keep the Council informed of the humanitarian situation on the ground. Considering the increasingly dire humanitarian situation in Sudan and rising incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, Council members may consider inviting Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten to brief the Council at its next meeting in September.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Most Council members share similar concerns about the political, security, human rights, and humanitarian situations in Sudan. The Council members are also supportive of the Trilateral Mechanism, which is comprised of the AU, IGAD, and UNITAMS.

Since the outset of the conflict in Sudan, the regional bodies have strived to find a resolution to the conflict. It appears that these initiatives have been riddled with complex regional dynamics, limiting their prospects. According to media reports, in a BBC radio interview on 4 June, Malik Agar, the deputy chairman of Sudan's Sovereign Council, declared that "Sudan is not part of the African Union's initiative", noting its suspension from the AU, which occurred following the October 2021 coup. He added that Sudan "cannot even discuss [the AU's] initiative". Regarding the IGAD initiative, the Sudanese government issued a statement on 15 June rejecting the sub-regional body's decision to appoint Kenya to succeed South Sudan in leading the mediation, accusing Kenya of adopting "the

positions of the rebel Rapid Support Forces". The SAF did not participate in the 10 July meeting of the IGAD Quartet, citing its objection to Kenyan President William Ruto's chairmanship of the Quartet. The statement issued by the Sudanese Foreign Ministry following the meeting said that "failure to respect the positions of Member States will cause the Government of Sudan to reconsider the usefulness of its membership in IGAD".

It seems that Council members have diverging views on appropriate Council engagement in response to the escalation of violence in Sudan. Apparently, the three African members (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique, known as the A3), with the support of Russia and China, have argued that adopting a Council product could duplicate messaging and create complications at a delicate time. This also appears to reflect Sudan's national position: in a 12 May press statement, Sudan's Permanent Representative to the UN, Al-Harith Idriss al-Harith Mohamed, noted that "we do not prefer an involvement of [the] Security Council in terms of any products". He added that the Council's engagement on the ongoing situation in Sudan might undermine the AU's efforts to engage positively with the situation.

Following the Sudanese government's 8 June decision to declare Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) Volker Perthes *persona non grata,* Council members hold diverging views about Perthes continuing in this role. During the 9 August Council meeting, while some Council members, including Albania, France, Switzerland, and the US, supported Perthes' efforts, Russia maintained that Perthes has lost the confidence of the Sudanese people. During the meeting, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield (US) said that "the Sudanese government threatened to end the UN Mission in Sudan if the SRSG [Perthes] participated in this briefing". In a press stakeout following the meeting, Ambassador Al-Harith Idriss al-Harith Mohamed (Sudan) referred to his government's decision on Perthes and said that the government opposes any "working relationship" with the special representative.
The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions. Ambassador Harold Adlai Agyeman (Ghana) chairs the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

What is artificial intelligence (AI)?
CHECK: https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence

What are the possibilities and the challenges of AI?

What are the challenges posed by technologies like artificial intelligence to promote peace and international security?

Political Affairs Chief Spells Out Double-edged Nature of D Technologies, in Briefing to Security Council

Members Also Hear from Representatives of Civil Society, Academia

READ the statements:

https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14899.doc.htm

WATCH: https://youtu.be/tIT2yIyGuOY
WATCH: https://youtu.be/-CXkHs3cxa4
WATCH: https://youtu.be/MJF85XzFuDQ

The problem is that generative AI systems like **ChatGPT** use **sophisticated algorithms** that **convert vast amounts of raw data into texts, images, and other content that seem to be produced by humans.** It is thought to have widespread application in industrial, business, and military operations, which can potentially **disrupt the geopolitical balance.**

For instance, in an article in the *Arms Control Today* in June 2023, it is highlighted that "lawmakers and senior Pentagon officials who seek to apply these technologies as possible argue that this approach will provide the United States with a distinct advantage over China and other rivals." Likewise, in the article, it is reported that "witnesses at an April 19 hearing, acknowledged that **the hasty application of AI to military systems entailed a significant risk.** For instance, Josh Lospiono warned that the data used in training the **algorithms** employed in generative AI systems **"can be altered by nefarious actors"** and also are vulnerable to **spoofing** by potential adversaries.

CHECK: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FINAL%20--%20JLospinoso%20Testimony%20for%20the%20Record_SASC_Cyber%20_%2019Apr23.pdf

You probably think that artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies are new in the security agenda. **You might be surprised to know that as part of the workstream established ten years ago (2013) on the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) started focusing on the impact of AI on international peace and security.** UNIDIR was convinced that mitigating or reducing the potential harms caused by AI would be crucial to harness **"AI for Good".**

Background Artificial intelligence (AI) research in the last 50 years developed a powerful set of tools including search algorithms, discriminators and recognizers, and new advances mean that machines will soon interact with the world in new ways. This was expected to have many impacts, including important potential ramifications for international security. To date, these ramifications have been explored only cursorily or very narrowly. Notably, since the 2013 States Parties to the **Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)** have discussed questions related to "**emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems"** with subsequent meetings of experts held in 2014, 2015, and 2016, and a Group of Governmental Experts on the subject scheduled in November 2017. Given the voids in the field, the Secretary General's Advisory Board on

Disarmament Matters recommended in July 2017 that States commission UNIDIR to carry out a study on **"the likely impact of artificial intelligence on international security".**

While AI could be used to uphold international security, the risks it presents as the technology continues to mature are manifold, warranting attention from the highest levels of the international community. This workstream sought to facilitate a common understanding among the many stakeholders—including States, international organizations, industry, and civil society—that will be critical to the development of norms and governance in the realm.

The objectives involve exploring the following themes central to the relationship between artificial intelligence and international security:

• **Functional Concerns:** The development and future deployment of autonomous weapons systems underline challenges posed by increased reliance on AI, including the possibility for accidents.

• **Manipulation and Weaponization:** As current AI approaches rely upon machine learning algorithms; its use contains inherent vulnerabilities—with the collected data sets as well as the algorithms themselves subject to manipulation. Assertions that the algorithm-driven weaponization of information was used to influence foreign elections underscores the destabilizing potential of AI. Some suggest AI will inevitably be used to enhance cyberattacks, to even "create and control cyberweapons". Such usage adds dimension to the era of constant "low-to-moderate level cyber-attacks" as envisioned by US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.

• **Conflict and Stability:** Increased reliance on automation and AI technologies may fundamentally **alter the nature of conflict.** The increasing insulation of some parties from the physical battlefield could alter the way in which those societies not only conducts but perceives of war. Meanwhile, 1 UNIDIR (2016), Safety, Unintentional Risk and Accidents in the Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies (UNIDIR papers on the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies). United Nations Activities on Artificial Intelligence (AI) because decisions be made faster, and vulnerabilities more quickly exposed (and perhaps patched), the overall AI capacity will likely "put security actors in a constant state of high alert" – with ramifications for strategic stability.

• **Commercial Development:** Much of the development of AI-related technologies, including autonomous systems, is taking place in the commercial sector. The implications of this shift, and the potential dual-use nature of AI—as it pertains to the vulnerability of components, the makeup of the global defense industry, and the possibility of regulation—are yet to be explored.

• **Accessibility and Asymmetry:** For now, large industry players and traditional powers like the United States and China like mentioned before remain at the forefront of investment in AI. But there are questions as to whether and how access to expertise and sensitive technologies will proliferate. If AI becomes widespread, it may in fact echo the impact of the cyber domain on international security, providing a tool for non-state actors and nation-states alike to conduct asymmetric warfare, threatening stability in the process.

• **Structural Impact:** Artificial intelligence will be at the heart of what the World Economic Forum has called a **Fourth Industrial Revolution.** The automation of particular industries will have a disproportionate effect across states, and the corresponding restructuring of the global economy will have a profound effect on geopolitics and power dynamics in the international system. The very foundation of international security could be upended in the long term because of the far-reaching impact of the AI revolution.

Other Relevant Resolutions

Resolution 68/243, General Assembly. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security
CHECK: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/454/03/PDF/N1345403.pdf?OpenElement

Most Recent Developments in AI in the Security Council

The U.N. Security Council holds a meeting on Artificial intelligence at U.N. headquarters in New York City, U.S., July 18, 2023. REUTERS/Brendan McDermid
James Cleverly, Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs addresses the U.N. Security Council during a meeting on Artificial intelligence at U.N. headquarters in New York City, U.S., July 18, 2023. REUTERS/Brendan McDermid

On July of 2023, the Security Council held a high-level briefing titled **"Artificial Intelligence: Opportunities and Risks for International Peace and Security". James Cleverly,** the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Affairs of the United Kingdom, chaired the meeting. Briefings were provided by relevant participants, such as the UN Secretary-General António Guterres; Jack Clark, Co-founder of Anthropic; and Yi Zeng, Professor at the Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences.

READ some of the **STATEMENTS** made in this encounter: https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15359.doc.htm
UNITED KINGDOM: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-speech-at-the-united-nations-security-council--2
UNITED STATES: https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-high-level-briefing-on-artificial-intelligence/
SWITZERLAND: https://www.aplusforpeace.ch/briefing-artificial-intelligence-opportunities-and-risks-international-peace-and-security
JAPAN: https://www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/takei071823.html

GHANA: https://www.ghanamissionun.org/07182023-2/
CHINA: http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202307/t20230719_11114947.htm
ALBANIA: https://ambasadat.gov.al/united-nations/remarks-by-ambassador-ferit-hoxha-at-the-security-council-meeting-on-artificial-intelligence-opportunities-and-risks-for-international-peace-and-security/

> The speaker for Ecuador similarly rejected the militarization of AI and reiterated the risk posed by lethal autonomous weapons. "The robotization of conflict is a great challenge for our disarmament efforts and an existential challenge that this Council ignores at its peril," he warned. Adding that AI can either contribute to or undermine peace efforts, he emphasized that "our responsibility is to promote and make the most of technological development as a facilitator of peace".

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres speaks to the Security Council during a meeting on Artificial intelligence in New York City, on July 18, 2023. © Reuters

> António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, noting that AI has been compared to the printing press, observed that — while it took more than 50 years for printed books to become widely available across Europe — "ChatGPT reached 100 million users in just two months". Despite its potential to turbocharge global development and realize human rights, AI can amplify bias, reinforce discrimination, and enable new levels of authoritarian surveillance.
>
> The advent of generative AI "could be a defining moment for disinformation and hate speech", he observed and, while questions of governance will be complex for several reasons, the international community already has entry points. The best approach would be to address existing challenges while also creating capacity to respond to future risks, he said, and underlined the need to "work together for AI that bridges social, digital and economic divides — not one that pushes us further apart".

According to the concept note prepared by the United Kingdom, the meeting was meant to provide an opportunity for members to exchange views on the possible implications of AI on international peace and security and to promote its safe and responsible use.

In recent years, there have been significant advances in the development of AI technologies, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated and accessible. The concept note described the **potential of AI to facilitate the UN's efforts to promote international peace and security.** In this respect, it says that AI could be used to improve conflict analysis and early warning, monitor ceasefires, and support mediation efforts. **On the other hand, AI poses a serious risk if misused by states and non-state actors to contribute to instability and exacerbate conflict situations,** including through the spread of online disinformation and hate speech. AI technologies could also potentially be used to increase cyber-attack capabilities, and to design bioweapons and weapons of mass destruction.

PAY ATTENTION to guiding questions included in the concept note, which were provided with the briefing:

> - How can Council Members promote the safe and responsible development of AI to maintain international peace and security, whilst seizing the opportunities it brings for sustainable development?
> - How can AI be used to enhance the UN's peace and security toolkit?
> - How can the Council better monitor and prevent the emerging risk that the development and use of AI could exacerbate conflicts and instability?

The meeting was part of the broader campaign by the UK to bring more attention to the challenges posed by the rapid development of AI. On 29 March, the UK published a white paper with recommendations for the AI industry, outlining a holistic approach for regulating the use of AI. In a 7 June press release, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced that the UK was going to host the first major summit on AI safety in fall.

Later, at the opening of the AI for Good Global Summit on 6 July, Guterres stressed that **member states "must urgently find consensus around essential guardrails to govern the development and deployment of AI for the good of all".** He also mentioned plans to establish a **High-Level Advisory Body on AI.** Guterres provided an update on the process of the Global Digital Compact. The Compact was envisioned in the Secretary-General's **Our Common Agenda report** as an agreement outlining **"shared principles for an open, free and secure digital future for all"** to be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024. In January, President of the General Assembly Csaba Kőrösi appointed Rwanda and Sweden as co-facilitators to lead the intergovernmental process on the Compact.

Some Council members emphasized the human rights risks posed by AI, including surveillance technologies that can be used to target communities or individuals. Others referred to the widening technological divide between developed and developing countries, which may exacerbate new forms of inequality.

This effort was not new. In recent years, Council members have shown increased interest in addressing the role of emerging technologies and their implications for international peace and security. Members have organized meetings on related aspects, including technology and security (23 May 2022); technology and peacekeeping (18 August 2021); and cybersecurity (29 June 2021). Certain AI-related issues have also been raised in informal Arria-formula meetings as was organized by China, together with then-Council members Kenya and Mexico, on the impact of emerging technologies on international peace and security.

While the Security Council is only beginning to discuss AI, the **United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has played an active role in AI ethics and governance. In November 2019, during UNESCO's 40th General Conference, member states tasked the organization with developing the first global normative instrument on the ethics of AI.** This decision led to the formation of an **Ad Hoc Expert Group (AHEG)** composed of 24 members appointed by the Director-General of UNESCO. ==**The AHEG produced a draft recommendation on the ethics of AI.**== Albeit non-binding, the text, which was adopted by all 193 member states, provides a **comprehensive framework covering a range of ethical issues related to AI,** including transparency, accountability, privacy, and the principles of design and deployment in a manner that upholds human rights. **The text recommends that member states set up suitable legal and institutional structures to ensure the ethical application of AI, stimulate ethical AI research, and promote the exchange of AI ethics information and best practices.**

READ THE RECOMMENDATION:
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000381137

CHECK: https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/towards-ethics-artificial-intelligence

CHECK: https://disarmamenthandbook.org/handbook/good-parliamentary-practice-recommendations-and-examples/disarmament-for-future-generations/#infobox5

https://disarmament.unoda.org/group-of-governmental-experts/

The Security Council has become increasingly involved in addressing cybersecurity and the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs). It has also sought to better leverage digital technologies to enhance the UN's work in the field. **To date, the Council convened formal meetings on cybersecurity on 29 June 2021 and on technology and peacekeeping on 18 August 2021.** Moreover, Council members have organized eight Arria-formula meetings—six as open meetings and two in a closed format—on cybersecurity and related topics. Council members also discussed the issue of cyber threats

and hybrid warfare in Georgia under "any other business" in a meeting requested by Estonia, the UK and the US on 5 March 2020, after Georgia informed the Council that its government and media websites had been targeted by a large-scale cyber-attack in October 2019.

There have also been Council discussions of cyber and digital threats to international peace and security in the context of sanctions evasion and the exploitation of ICTs for terrorist purposes. In **resolution 2129 (2013), the Security Council acknowledged the growing nexus between terrorism and ICTs and the use of such technologies to incite, recruit, fund, and plan terrorist acts. CHECK:** https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/624/37/PDF/N1362437.pdf?OpenElement

Digital technologies are playing an increasingly critical role in the UN's work. Digital tools contribute to conflict prevention by improving early warning and early action, facilitate the coordination of humanitarian assistance, support peacekeeping operations and the protection of civilians, expand access to mediation processes, and aid in reconciliation and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. However, digital technologies can also be misused by states and non-state actors to contribute to instability and exacerbate conflict situations, including through the spread of online disinformation and hate speech.

Briefing considered both the benefits of digital technologies and the threats posed by their misuse in conflict situations. At a 3 May press briefing, US Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield said that this topic is "**a new and important focus for the Security Council" and that "it is long past time for [the Council] to fully grapple with the impact of digital technologies" on international peace and security.** According to the concept note prepared by the US, the meeting aims to improve the Council's understanding of how digital technologies are shaping conflicts and how the UN must adapt its efforts accordingly.

More broadly, the Under Secretary General referred to the Secretary-General's **Roadmap on Digital Cooperation**, a 29 May 2020 report (A/74/821) offering recommendations to strengthen global digital cooperation. The report notes that **"new technologies are too often used for surveillance, repression, censorship and online harassment"** and that "greater efforts are needed to develop further guidance on how human rights standards apply in the digital age, including through the Human Rights Council". In this regard, Rosemary DiCarlo, and other participants, commended the adoption of Human Rights Council resolution 49/21 on 1 April regarding the **"role of states in countering the negative impact of disinformation on the enjoyment and realization of human rights".** The resolution calls on member states to refrain from conducting or sponsoring disinformation campaigns domestically or transnationally and decides that a high-level panel discussion on this topic will be convened during the Human Rights Council's next session.

CHECK: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/304/10/PDF/G2230410.pdf?OpenElement

DiCarlo also referred to the Secretary-General's <u>Our Common Agenda report</u>, which recommends the convening of a multi-stakeholder digital technology conference to adopt a Global Digital Compact outlining "shared principles for an open, free and secure digital future for all". According to the report, the Compact could also address ways to bridge the digital divide, avoid fragmentation of the Internet, protect personal data, and ensure accountability for online discrimination and misinformation.

While several Council members are expected to echo the Secretary-General's proposal for broad multi-stakeholder engagement on this topic, some members, including China and Russia, may stress that the onus of Internet governance lies with governments. Multi-stakeholder engagement has been a contentious issue at the **Open-Ended Working Group** (OEWG)—a General Assembly-mandated process responsible for expanding international consensus on the norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace and on how international law applies therein. The adoption of the OEWG program of work has been delayed this year because member states have been unable to agree on the modalities for the participation of stakeholders. It appears that while several member states have been pushing for a systematic, sustained, and meaningful participation of non-state actors, others have proposed following the same modalities of the first OEWG, in which preapproved NGOs were invited to official sessions as observers.

Nanjala Nyabola, Global Voices' new Advox Director. Photo courtesy Nanjala Nyabola.

As the director of Advox, a project dedicated to protecting online freedom of expression, Nanjala Nyabola highlighted the importance of an open Internet. In her book, *Digital Democracy, Analogue Politics: How the Internet Era is Transforming Politics in Kenya*, Nyabola maps the ways in which different groups in Kenya used Twitter to promote positive and negative politics, and how foreign capital funds campaigns that manipulate information and affect domestic and electoral politics.

The UN has increasingly sought to harness the potential of digital technologies in its field operations. On 15 August 2021, Secretary-General António Guterres released **a strategy for the digital transformation of UN peacekeeping**, which seeks to help UN

peacekeeping missions leverage digital technologies to implement their mandates more effectively and to improve the safety and security of peacekeepers.

Several Council members were expected to refer to the 18 August 2021 **presidential statement (S/PRST/2021/17)** prepared by India during its Council presidency, which recognized that **"technology has the potential to act as a force multiplier by enhancing performance, saving resources, simplifying work processes, and allowing peacekeeping missions to have a deeper understanding of the environments"** in which they operate. **CHECK:** https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-prst-2021-17.php

Council members are likely to provide country-specific examples of how digital technologies are contributing to peace and security or to instability, exacerbating conflict. Several members have explored how the spread of disinformation is negatively affecting the situation in Ukraine, while others have referred to how digital technologies are providing important information regarding humanitarian corridors and assistance in conflict-afflicted areas of the country.